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It is one of the strange paradoxes of international organizations law that whenever their normative 
activities have to be explained to students or other audiences, the story inevitably presents a gap. 
Usually, the story goes something like this. Organization X has limited formal law-making powers; it 
can sponsor conventions and on rare occasions enact binding legal instruments, but mostly the 
organization can only adopt recommendations and similar instruments, which are not supposed to 
legally bind their addressees. However - so the story continues - this does not mean that organization 
X has only a limited standard-setting role to play: its normative authority is far greater than the sum 
of its law-making powers would seem to indicate. 
With the possible exception of the EU (which can boast serious law-making powers, and is hardly the 
archetypical international organization at any rate2), the above story applies to nigh-on every 
international organization: most of them have extremely limited law-making powers in any strict 
sense of that term, and yet most of them play an important role in global politics, so much so that it is 
by no means eccentric to suggest that international law generally has to a large extent become 
‘institutionalized’.3 
 The observation is far from novel, and over the years, international lawyers have tried to capture the 
normatively relevant output of international organizations in various ways.4 Some have suggested 
that it may overlap with customary international law or crystallize into customary international law 
but this, in turn, warrants a very expansive notion of that category, and even then, it applies mostly to 
the normative output of the General Assembly of the United Nations – it will have considerably less 
force when explaining the normative output of, say, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
                                                        
1 Professor of International Law, University of Helsinki. While the usual disclaimer applies, I am strongly indebted to Gian 
Luca Burci and Kristina Daugirdas for their incisive comments on an earlier draft. 
2 See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, ‘Sui Generis? The European Union as an International Organization’, in Dennis Patterson and Anna 
Södersten (eds), A Companion to European Union Law and International Law (Wiley, 2016) 3. 
3 Matthias Ruffert and Christian Walter, Institutionalisiertes Völkerrecht (Beck, 2009); an English version appeared as 
Matthias Ruffert and Christian Walter, Institutionalised International Law (Nomos, 2015). 
4 For further discussion, see Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Organizations Law, 3rd edn (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015) 158-168. 
Development, or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or the Food and 
Agricultural Organization.  
Others have suggested that sometimes, nomen est omen: the designation of an instrument may 
imbue it with unexpected normative force. A declaration, after all, on the face of it purports to 
declare that which already exists. To this, the inevitable response is that words are cheap and labels 
can be misguided or deceptive: just because something is called ‘Declaration’ does not mean it 
actually ‘declares’ an existing state of affairs – indeed, using the term ’declaration’ might just be a 
clever way of dressing up some political project. An important example is the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights which, most observers agree, was aspirational rather than declaratory at the time of its 
adoption. And many have, somewhat in resignation, decided to label the majority of the normative 
output of international organizations as ‘soft law’; this at least has the benefit of suggesting that the 
output is not ‘hard law’, but ultimately merely shifts the problem: instead of saying we have no 
explanation for a particular phenomenon, we now label it as soft law, using a term for which we have 
no further explanation, and which may in the process send a number of highly questionable 
epistemological messages, not least of which the suggestion that law can actually be softly binding.5 
Whatever their inherent merits, those explanations are all based on the assumption that the model of 
law-making by international organizations has not undergone any change since the days when 
organizations were first created and endowed with law-making powers: the underlying model is still 
rather ‘nineteenth century’ in character, based on nicely delimited patterns of authority. In such a 
model, sometimes referred to as based on the classic command model of political authority,6 it is 
presumed that states have their own decision-making procedures. These states meet at the 
international level, reach agreement to do something or abstain from doing something, cast their 
agreement in the legally prescribed form, after which it will be approved in accordance with domestic 
procedures and enter into force, typically between those same states. 
This was, in a nutshell, the descriptive model of treaty-making in the nineteenth century and for much 
of the twentieth century as well, and came to be applied without giving it much further thought to 
international organizations too. Indeed, it is telling that the first relevant international case-law on the 
topic displayed a lack of further imagination. In the case concerning the possible resumption of 
railway traffic between Poland and Lithuania following the First World War, if it could be 
demonstrated that both Poland and Lithuania had agreed to the text of a resolution, then they would 
have to accept that text as legally binding.7 The resolution, coming about through the intermediary of 
the relevant international organization (in this case the League of Nations), did not change the legal 
nature of the transaction; the resolution was conceptualized, so to speak, as a collection of dyads of 
                                                        
5 Jan Klabbers, ‘The Redundancy of Soft Law’ (1996) 65 Nordic Journal of International Law 167. 
6 See, e.g., Nico Krisch, ‘Liquid Authority in Global Governance’ (2017) 9 International Theory 237. 
7 Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland (Railway Sector Landwarów-Kaisiadorys), [1931] Publ. PCIJ, Series B, No. 5. 
bilateral relationships. This has been referred to as the ‘treaty analogy’, and for good reason.8 But 
analogies can only go so far: the treaty analogy may explain the binding nature of instruments 
adopted unanimously by or within international organizations, but falls short of saying anything 
sensible when instruments are adopted by majority or, worse, when instruments are promulgated by 
secretariats. 
An important feature of this classic model was also that it was somehow considered staunchly dualist: 
in line with the late nineteenth century writings of Heinrich Triepel,9 the assumption was taken over, 
from general international law, that commitments between states are literally just that: commitments 
between states, not radiating to anyone else. This was no doubt tenable with respect to regular 
treaties in the days when Triepel did most of his work, and he himself, when returning to the topic, 
emphasized that he was not being dogmatic but that his insights were based on empirical 
observation: there simply was not a lot of international law properly so-called that would apply to 
individuals within states.10 
But it was different with international organizations, although few realized it at the time: it is telling 
that Louis Renault, at the close of the nineteenth century, could discuss international organizations 
solely in terms of advantages and disadvantages for their member states - an approach that resonates 
to this day in most work on international organizations by scholars working in the discipline of 
international relations.11 It was different with international organizations, Renault notwithstanding, in 
that it seemed only natural to suppose that rules emanating from the International Labour 
Organization would somehow affect labourers and employers, and would do so without always 
requiring mediation by the state. By the same logic, it seemed natural to suppose that the work of the 
sanitary organizations, the forerunners of the WHO, would and even should affect individuals, and 
again would not always demand mediation by the state. Indeed, some intuitively realized that there 
was something different about international organizations, although they could not quite put their 
finger on it just yet. Friedrich von Martens, e.g., captured much of this under the heading 
international administrative law, suggesting a category distinct from traditional public international 
law.12 
There might be some merit in further reflecting on how departures from the classic command model 
of political authority affect the normative output of international organizations. It is the purpose of 
this paper to do just this, and to do so with the help of looking at the output of the World Health 
Organization. There are various reasons for focusing on the WHO. One such reason is that unlike most 
other international organizations, the WHO actually has law-making powers in all but name, even if it 
                                                        
8 Klabbers, above n 4, 158. 
9 Heinrich Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (C.L. Hirschfeld, 1899). 
10 Heinrich Triepel, ‘Les rapports entre le droit interne et le droit international’ (1923) 1 Recueil des Cours 75. 
11 Louis Renault, ’Les unions internationales: leurs avantages at leurs inconvénients’ (1896) 3 Revue Générale de Droit 
International Public 14. 
12 F.F. de Martens, Traité de droit international (Alfred Léo trans, Maresq Ainé, 1886) volume II. 
has used them sparingly. Another reason is that it makes much use of other instruments, less 
obviously of a legal nature; this makes the WHO an interesting laboratory.13 Third, and related, the 
WHO is a veritable pioneer in the use of partnerships, whether solely with other international 
organizations (best-known is the Codex Alimentarius Commission, a joint venture of the WHO and the 
FAO) or also involving other actors, including the private sector: it is no coincidence that academic 
work on the role of public-private partnerships often zooms in on partnerships that somehow involve 
the WHO.14 Thus, there are good reasons to suppose that a closer look at the WHO may reveal results 
that can either be generalized or can result in further hypothesis development. Indeed, it was already 
noted almost four decades ago that precisely within the WHO, authority is exercised on the basis of 
expertise and knowledge: reports drawn up by expert committees ‘are widely regarded by physicians 
and health services throughout the world as standard guides to practice.’15 
I will first make the claim, in section II, that authority is not merely laid down in legal instruments, but 
spreads far more widely than that. Theoretically, this is vaguely inspired by the writings of the likes of 
Antonio Gramsci16 and Michel Foucault,17 but instead of laying the theoretical groundwork, my 
interest is in how exactly this authority can translate into something that is legally relevant. 
Consequently, this section will conceptualize, rather than theorize, what I will refer to as epistemic 
authority.18  Section III will systematically discuss the normative authority of the WHO in various 
manners: through its household decisions; through its decisions aimed at activating member states, 
and through is collaborative efforts. And section IV will briefly, all too briefly, discuss the partnerships 
and other aspects of the WHO’s relationship with the world outside it. Section V concludes. 
 
II. On Epistemic Authority 
                                                        
13 Fidler already suggested two decades ago that the WHO was reluctant to use its law-making powers and suggested that 
it had vast epistemic authority, though without analyzing this in great depth. David Fidler, ‘The Future of the World Health 
Organization: What Role for International Law’ (1998) 31 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1079. 
14 See, e.g., Liliana Andonova, Governance Entrepreneurs: International Organizations and the Rise of Global Public-Private 
Partnerships (Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
15 Harold K. Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System, 2nd edn 
(Knopf, 1984) 124. 
16 Relatively little work on international organizations has been done in a specifically Gramscian tradition, but see the 
excellent study by Craig Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance Since 1850 (Polity, 
1994). Less specifically devoted to international organizations but no less excellent is Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, 
and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (Columbia University Press, 1987). 
17 An excellent recent study in Foucauldian mode is Guy Fiti Sinclair, To Reform the World: International Organizations and 
the Making of Modern States (Oxford University Press, 2017). 
18 Note that I am not particularly interested for present purposes in establishing whether there is an epistemic community 
of global health officials or how such a community operates or what effects it may engender. On such issues, see, e.g., 
Peter M. Haas, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’ (1992) 46 International 
Organization 1; Ian Johnstone, The Power of Deliberation: International Law, Politics and Organizations (Oxford University 
Press, 2011). 
 
University courses on international politics (often labelled International Relations) tend to start with 
the proposition that the world is made up of some 200 or so sovereign states, and that those states 
are all interested in acquiring power. Nuances may be added, highlighting a role for other actors, but 
that starting point is well-nigh invariably state-centric, and often revolving around power. 
International politics thus presented as predominantly a struggle for power, taking place in what is 
characterized as predominantly a system composed of states. The net result is that students of 
international relations become socialized into thinking that international politics is a matter of states, 
and is a matter of those states struggling for power – it becomes difficult to think in different terms. 
The possible role of other actors is constantly downplayed or simply absent from any discussion, and 
the thought that not all states might have a similar interest in power never even enters the picture. 
International Relations students interested in altruism, or interested in actors other than states (the 
class struggle, the role of companies, the influence of civil society) have a hard time justifying their 
projects, at least when they want to point to fundamental structures. Those who claim that 
international politics is not about states but about corporations engaged in power struggles will have 
a hard time getting their point across, and might even have difficulties finding a vocabulary to express 
the thought: the very word ‘international’ suggests the epistemological priority of nations or states. 
Telling is that a relatively recent study on international organizations by an international relations 
scholar presents the attention it pays to intergovernmental organizations as an innovation, an 
academic breakthrough.19  
The above is a succinct description of the exercise of epistemic authority, in this case by politics 
professors. Repeating and reproducing the creed that international politics is a matter of states and 
their struggle for power makes it almost impossible to think of alternative ways of framing global 
politics. What is more, the students of those professors, upon graduation, become policy-makers and 
policy-advisors, advising governments or trade unions or business associations that the only actors of 
relevance are states, and that all other states are lusting after power, so their own government 
cannot afford not to do the same; in this way, what started out as an academic heuristic of some 
plausibility becomes its own ironclad, cast-in-stone truth. And in a sense, that is the very point: aiming 
to be influential in politics often implies attempting to affect the way other people view reality.20 
There is nothing particularly novel about this observation, going back (in general fashion) to theorizing 
about authority by the likes of Gramsci and Foucault and, before them, Durkheim and Weber, and 
sociologist Steven Lukes in his classic Power: A Radical View could write with some aplomb that 
                                                        
19 Tana Johnson, Organizational Progeny (Oxford University Press, 2014), e.g. at 65 (previous research misses elements of 
the power of international organizations ’for it has focused on state-only scenarios’), or at 202 (a key theoretical 
contribution is achieved by ’raising concerns about conventional state-centric views and drawing attention to non-state 
actors’). 
20 Pertti Alasuutari and Ali Qadir, ‘Epistemic Governance: An Approach to the Politics of Policy-Making’ (204) 1 European 
Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology 67. 
shaping people’s ‘perceptions, cognitions and preferences’ might well be ‘the most supreme and 
insidious exercise of power’.21 
International politics professors are not the only professors engaging in epistemic authority. John 
Maynard Keynes, himself once described as ‘the chief intellectual influence on English public life in 
the twentieth century’,22 already ascribed much the same to economists and political philosophers,23 
and international lawyers exercise epistemic authority when claiming that states are the main 
subjects of international law; that states are sovereign entities; that treaties are based on agreement 
between states, or that treaties should be interpreted following a specific procedure.24 All of these 
are plausible enough heuristic devices in their own right, but all come to dominate discussions and 
grow into something more akin to a paradigm, even on Kuhn’s narrow conceptualization of that 
term.25 Those who disagree are few and far between, for alternative ways of looking at the 
international legal order or at treaties are hardly thinkable (this is what makes such propositions 
paradigmatic), and if they do, they may point out that the individual is becoming an important subject 
of international law,26 or that humanity is becoming the alpha and omega of international law,27 or 
that treaties are often enough agreement to disagree,28 or that interpreters should exercise the 
classic virtue of phronesis.29 While the former group is more successful, the latter is trying to proffer 
alternatives – but both are engaged in the exercise of epistemic authority. 
Epistemic authority is all around us and potentially affects all walks of life, but the term itself carries a 
strong ambivalence. Epistemic authority can refer to authority resting on epistemic elements, in 
particular knowledge and science – this may perhaps be referred to as passive epistemic authority. It 
can however also refer to being exercised on that basis: active epistemic authority. In the former case, 
the general idea is that knowledge informs policy-making which in turn gets translated into proper, 
generally recognized legal instruments: conventions, resolutions, declarations. But here the 
ambivalence sets in, in that epistemic authority can also be exercised without the intermediary of 
proper, generally recognized legal instruments: if the authority of the organization concerned derives 
                                                        
21 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (MacMillan, 1974) 24. 
22 Richard Davenport-Hines, Universal Man: The Seven Lives of John Maynard Keynes (William Collins, 2015) 6. 
23 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money (MacMillan, 1970 [1936]) 383-384. 
Keynes had dedicated his earlier The Economic Consequences of the Peace (MacMillan, 1920) to the intentional ‘formation 
of the general opinion of the future’, in a quest to influence public opinion, convinced as he was that the future depended 
not on the acts of statesmen, but on ‘instruction and imagination’: at 279 and 278, respectively. 
24 A stark example of how authoritative this can be is Gunnar Törber, The Contractual Nature of the Optional Clause (Hart, 
2015). 
25 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edn (University of Chicago Press, 1970). 
26 Kate Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal System: Continuity and Change in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
27 Anne Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega of Sovereignty’ (2009) 20 European Journal of International Law 513. 
28 In Allott’s brilliant phrase, treaties are ’disagreement reduced to writing’: Philip Allott, ‘The Concept of International 
Law’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 31. 
29 Jan Klabbers, ‘Virtuous Interpretation’, in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias and Panos Merkouris (eds), Treaty 
Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years On (Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 17. 
from science and knowledge (or, more accurately, is thought to derive from science and knowledge) 
and is therewith considered objective and a-political, then why bother with legal instruments? Surely, 
if science indicates that having unprotected sex is a health risk, then only fools would suggest they will 
sponsor unprotected sex unless there is a legal rule in place saying they shall not do so. If science 
indicates that emitting noxious fumes into the air causes climate change, then only a fool would insist 
that in the absence of a clear legal obligation he30 will not act so as to reduce emissions.31 On this line 
of thought, the authority becomes unrelated to any legal instrument, and is exercised directly, 
unmediated, on the strength of the scientific evidence. The law might be able to add a few details on 
specific consequences (by distributing responsibility, for instance32), but the impulse to act stems 
from the basis in science and knowledge, rather than from there being a legal obligation to act.33 
The idea that science and knowledge can be founts of authority has slowly taken hold, and has 
translated into a burgeoning literature dissecting the concepts of knowledge and expertise of 
international organizations, suggesting that much of what passes for objective knowledge is itself 
politically constructed. In recent years, the use of indicators by international organizations,34 
rankings,35 expertise,36 manuals and handbooks,37 and related phenomena38 has been discussed and 
analyzed by lawyers and non-lawyers alike – therewith, passive epistemic authority as discussed 
above turns out, to some extent at least, to be an ideological chimera: while knowledge per se can 
well be objective or neutral, the choice for emphasizing some knowledge over other knowledge 
(some indicators over others; aggregate knowledge over granular knowledge; some ‘best practices’ 
over others) is decidedly political. 
                                                        
30 It occurred to me that here the masculine form might not be inappropriate. 
31 See further Jan Klabbers, ‘On Responsible Global Governance’, in Jan Klabbers, Maria Varaki and Guilherme Vasconcelos 
Vilaça (eds.), Towards Responsible Global Governance (University of Helsinki, 2018) 11.  
32 Although with climate change this has proved to be vexing: see, e.g., Henry Shue, ‘Transboundary Damage in Climate 
Change: Criteria for Allocating responsibility’, in André Nollkaemper and Dov Jacobs (eds), Distribution of Responsibilities 
in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 321. 
33 Jurisprudentially, this does not entail endorsing the position that law generally causes action. At best, law can help 
provide reasons or justifications for people to act in this way rather than that, but not much more. 
34 Kevin E. Davis, Angelina Fisher, Benedict Kingsburg and Sally Engle Merry (eds), Governance by Indicators: Global Power 
through Quantification and Rankings (Oxford University Press, 2012); Sally Engle Merry, The Seduction of Quantification 
(University of Chicago Press, 2016). 
35 Alexander Cooley and Jack L. Snyder (eds), Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of Global Governance 
(Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
36 Ole Jacob Sending, The Politics of Expertise: Competing for Authority in Global Governance (University of Michigan Press, 
2017); David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy (Princeton 
University Press, 2016); Roger Koppl, Expert Failure (Cambridge University Press, 2018); Erin Hannah, James Scott and Silke 
Trommer (eds.), Expert Knowledge in Global Trade (Routledge, 2016). 
37 Fleur Johns, Non-Legality in International Law: Unruly Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Jan Klabbers, ‘Notes on 
the Ideology of International Organizations Law: The International Organization for Migration, State-making, and the 
Market for Migration’ (2019) 32 Leiden Journal of International Law, forthcoming. 
38 Sinclair, above n 17. 
If passive epistemic authority has spawned a cottage industry of concerned writings, the active 
version of ‘epistemic authority’ (authority directly exercised by those with epistemic authority) has 
received less attention: how to understand the legal character (if any) and legal effects (if any) of 
authority exercised on epistemic basis, but not cast in recognizably legal form? Active epistemic 
authority can stem from politicians and follow the command model of authority complete with 
respect for proper law-making procedures, but these mark just the tip of the iceberg, as authority can 
also be exercised by others, and in other ways. The language we use, for instance, is strongly 
influenced by what counts as proper speech, perhaps as set out in the Oxford English Dictionary. Our 
word processors’ spell-check function will suggest that we write Catholic with a capital c (C), even if 
we mean it as an adjective, as when referring to a scholar’s catholic use of references. The food we 
eat owes something to what we read about health and food, about the benefits of local produce 
perhaps, or the health risks of peanut butter or eggs or ginger. The clothes we wear or cosmetics we 
apply may be inspired by role models we see on reality television, or ‘influencers’ (nomen est omen) 
we follow on-line, and in no small measure do we respond to advertising. 
The present contribution aims to flesh out how this plays out in a specific international organization: 
the World Health Organization, which potentially makes for a good case study. The more important 
point still to make is why lawyers should be bothered, for on a narrow interpretation of the lawyer’s 
task, it could be suggested that the lawyer limits herself to formal legal instruments, and ignores the 
rest as being outside her jurisdiction.39 And on some level this is perfectly acceptable: the lawyer 
ought to address the law, but not pretend to be a social scientist or policy analyst. There are, 
nonetheless, two issues here. First, these roles can never be kept entirely separate; try as she might, 
the lawyer merely speaking about classic legal instruments cannot avoid saying something about 
related instruments. Second, and more importantly, the lawyer is trained to understand and analyze 
patterns of authority and governance and their consequences for compliance, implementation, 
governance, accountability, and related issues, and is therefore uniquely qualified to speak up about 
such issues – far more so than the social scientist or policy analyst, for whom these terms only 
exceptionally figure in their vocabularies. Hence, if the lawyer remains silent, few will speak up, and 
that would neither result in accurate depictions of the world around us nor, one would think, be 
desirable: it would provide authorities, of whatever provenance, with limitless license to exercise 
their authority. 
                                                        
39 This is often reflected in legal studies: they often remain limited to discussing the recognized instruments, but not much 
more. See, e.g., Gian Luca Burci and Andrew Cassels, ’Health’, in Jacob Katz Cogan, Ian Hurd and Ian Johnstone (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of International Organizations (Oxford University Press, 2016) 447; Steven A. Solomon, ‘Instruments of 
Global Health Governance at the World Health Organization’, in Ilona Kickbusch et al. (eds.), Global Health Diplomacy: 
Concepts, Issues, Actors, Instruments (New York: Springer 2013), 187-198; Lawrence O. Gostin, Devi Sridhar and Daniel 
Hougendobler, ‘The Normative Authority of the World Health Organization’, (2015) 30 Public Health, 1-10. Gostin et al. 
explicitly distinguish the normative authority of the WHO from its ‘technical’ authority (at 1, note d), therewith suggesting 
the latter is devoid of normative ambitions or effects. 
 
III. On the WHO 
 
Open the website of the WHO, click on ‘About us’ and then ‘What we do’, and the bland one-line 
description of what the WHO does is followed by a brief statement of its current goals. First 
mentioned here is ‘to ensure that a billion more people have universal health coverage’, and that is a 
claim that should raise considerable curiosity. In a world where presidents of powerful states have 
just almost single-handedly dismantled nationwide health insurance schemes put in place by their 
predecessors, the first stated goal of the World Health Organization, the premier global health 
institution, is to ensure universal health coverage.  
So how can this work? Clearly, the standard way in which international lawyers and others look at 
international organizations such as the WHO is that these exercise delegated functions and powers, 
delegated to them by their member states, with a view to doing the sort of things those member 
states tell them to do.40 While it is generally accepted that member states cannot envisage every 
contingency in advance, and thus organizations can sometimes engage in activities not expressly 
delegated to them but delegated by implication, nonetheless the basic idea is clear: they should do 
what their member states tell them to do, and stay within the broad limits of their mandate. If not, 
they can be held to account by those same member states. While the WHO Constitution lists a huge 
amount of functions in Article 2 and it is reasonable to assume that many of these could be served by 
a decent system of universal health coverage, explicit authority on insurance matters is lacking. 
Hence, there must be some other kind of idea accounting for the WHO’s call to universal health 
coverage, and the answer may well reside in the fact that it is the WHO that makes the point, rather 
than, say, the Food and Agricultural Organization or the International Atomic Energy Agency. The 
WHO’s mandate is health-related41, and the WHO can suggest it has the sort of expertise that is 
relevant on this topic: one can imagine WHO experts persuasively calling for universal health coverage 
in ways that do not apply to the customs experts at the World Customs Organization or the 
meteorologists at the World Meteorological Organization.  
If this is plausible (or perceived as plausible), it may be concluded that the WHO, by calling for 
universal health coverage, is exercising, or aspiring to exercise, epistemic authority, and the current 
and next sections of this paper will sketch just how this may work in more general terms by providing 
an overview of the sort of activities employed and instruments and practices adopted by the WHO. 
                                                        
40 See, e.g., Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney (eds.), Delegation and Agency in 
International Organizations (Cambridge University Press, 2006). For a critique, see Jan Klabbers, ‘The EJIL Foreword: The 
Transformation of International Organizations Law’ (2015) 26 European Journal of International Law 9. 
41 On the relevance of an organization’s mandate, see Jan Klabbers, ‘Reflections on Role Responsibility: The Responsibility 
of International Organizations for Failing to Act’ (2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 1133. 
The call for universal health coverage is but an example, and one that may owe something to the 
personal preferences of the WHO’s current Director General, Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus.42 
The WHO was created in 1946 as a specialized agency of the UN, and one of the reasons for its 
creation was to ‘defrag’ the rather fragmented system of international health governance existing at 
the time. The earliest regional health bureaus had been established, as sanitary councils in the 1830s 
and 1840s. The Pan American Health Organization, set up in 1902, covered the Americas, while the 
International Office of Public health, set up in 1907 and open to universal membership, mostly 
covered Europe and the Middle East, although the US and some Latin American states joined as well. 
Moreover, the League of Nations had encompassed a dedicated health organization, and it seemed a 
good idea to centralize global health governance in a single organization. This did not work entirely as 
planned: the Pan American Health Organization still exists independently albeit in a complicated 
formal relationship with the WHO (it ‘doubles’ as the WHO’s regional office in the Americas). But 
nonetheless, 1946 saw the creation of the WHO, marking a shift, it seems, from earlier conceptions43 
about protecting the global North against the spread of infectious diseases (hence the regional 
sanitary bureaus), to an organization devoted to achieving high overall levels of health for everyone.44 
One prominent contemporary observer was suitably impressed by the scope of its standard-setting 
powers and the degree of de-politicization (i.e. leaving matters to health professionals) envisaged in 
its Constitution: ‘In no other organization has as much legislative power been granted, or as much 
expert representation asked, though sovereignty remains fully respected.’45 
Historian Mark Mazower notes that from its birth, the WHO focused strongly on disease eradication 
by utilizing advanced pharmaceutical technology and taking over the anti-malaria program of the UN 
Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA, dissolved in 1947). Shortly thereafter, after Democrats 
obtained a majority in the US Congress, it added a strong focus on technical assistance. This had not 
come out of the blue: during the two years of its interim existence in limbo (the Constitution was 
concluded in 1946 but only entered into force two years later, in 1948), the WHO had already trained 
health care professionals in various countries across the globe.46 Others, however, suggest that the 
emergence of the WHO after the war signified a move away from disease eradication. Alvarez for 
instance, following Fidler, suggests that the 1946 Constitution transformed the international health 
regime ‘from an inter-state border patrol scheme for certain infectious diseases to a framework for 
                                                        
42 See e.g. WHO Results Report, Programme Budget 2016-2017, Doc. WHA 71/28, at 2. 
43 Rosenberg notes with some acidity that prior to World War II, ‘(C)ommerce, colonialism and civilization itself seemed to 
rest upon halting the global circulation of disease.’ See Emily S. Rosenberg, Transnational Currents in a Shrinking World 
1870-1945 (Harvard University Press, 2012) 165. 
44 See Bob Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day (Routledge, 2009), at 
173. Sayre unapologetically (as was his wont) links the sanitary conventions to the need to prevent epidemics from 
spreading to the global north. See Francis B. Sayre, Experiments in International Administration (Harper and brothers, 
1919) 48-56.  
45 Clyde Eagleton, International Government, rev. edn (Ronald Press, 1948) 376. 
46 Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (Allen Lane, 2012) 284. 
international and national governance that merges the collective action system of the UN Charter 
with a human rights regime’.47 
 
a. Institutional matters48 
Like all institutions, whether the United Nations or the local table tennis club, organizations exercise 
some authority over their members in relation to the functioning the organization itself, and in doing 
so may exercise epistemic authority, e.g. by setting the standards under which withdrawal from the 
organization is possible, or which kinds of reservations can be accepted. While it is true that 
institutions generally exist in order to distribute or arrange things,49 inevitably their own existence 
also demands some action, and typically it is left to the members somehow to arrange for this. Here 
the concern is that the organization needs to discipline its members and other stakeholders in 
particular ways, and typically - though not invariably - this is done by law. 
In 1949-1950, ten member states from Eastern Europe, as well as China, seemed to withdraw from 
WHO, and typically did so without providing a legal justification. In the absence of a withdrawal clause 
in the Constitution, the Secretariat objected, and by and large ignored the withdrawal.50 The World 
Health Assembly was not particularly clear in its evaluation either: it adopted a resolution deploring 
the seeming withdrawal of some of them, but without saying anything much of substance on the 
legality question51, and generally treated the withdrawals as hardly having taken place: thus, the 
‘withdrawing’ states were considered to be bound by the International Sanitary Regulations which 
had been adopted during their absence.52 
By the same token, organizations may have to decide on the permissibility of reservations to their 
constitutions. This is rare in practice, and it is generally held that if and when such a reservation is 
made, it is in principle up to the organization’s ‘competent organ’ to decide on the issue, oblivious to 
the circumstance that few organizations designate their ‘competent organ’ in these matters in 
advance.53 Practically speaking, this usually entails that the matter comes up for decision by the 
                                                        
47 José E. Alvarez, The Impact of International Organizations on International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2016) 195. 
48 In what follows I distinguish institutional and substantive matters for ease of reference. The border between the two 
may, however, be porous. 
49 Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens (Russell Sage Foundation, 1992). 
50 On the influence of secretariats generally, see John Mathiason, Invisible Governance: International Secretariats in Global 
Politics (Kumarian, 2007). 
51 WHA Resolution 2.90, reproduced in WHO Official Records: Second World Health Assembly 1949 (WHO, 1949), at 52. 
The matter is discussed in general terms in Christopher Peters, Praxis Internationaler Organisationen – Vertragswandel 
und Völkerrechtlicher Ordnungsrahmen (Springer, 2016) 347-349. 
52 For lucid discussion, see Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity, 
6th edn (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2018), § 129.  
53 See Article 20(3) of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties with or between International Organizations; 
See further Maurice Mendelson, ‘Reservations to the Constitutions of International Organizations’ (1971) 45 British 
Yearbook of International Law 137. 
plenary body, and reportedly, this has been the case in WHO as well. Confronted with a reservation 
made by the US upon joining the organization, the World Health Assembly explicitly accepted it by 
consensus.54 What makes this extra piquant in light of the withdrawal discussion is that the US 
reservation posited that despite the absence of a withdrawal provision, the US had a right to 
withdraw upon giving a year’s notice. As Schermers and Blokker conclude, this ‘reveals that the US 
considered this reservation necessary and feared that in its absence withdrawal would prove 
impossible.’55 
Epistemic authority – in what is referred to above as the ‘active’ version -  may likewise be 
engendered by interpretations of other clauses, such as clauses on suspension of voting rights. In 
1964, the World Health Assembly resolved that Apartheid-era South Africa persistently violated the 
WHO Constitution, and that its voting privileges should be suspended. South Africa, not surprisingly, 
objected, and withdrew from the Assembly but not, interestingly, from the WHO as such.56 The point 
to note is that while there was a lot wrong with Apartheid-era South Africa, little of this would be 
captured by the WHO Constitution: such discussions rarely take place in the functional terms provided 
for by the Constitution.57 
Organizations may feel a need not merely to influence the behavior of their member states qua 
member states, but also the behavior of others. In traditional legal terms, they lack the authority to 
do so, but there are ways to overcome this and direct attention to undesirable forms of behavior. One 
illustrative example is the Report of the Committee of Experts on Tobacco Industry Documents, 
published in July 2000 and explicitly highlighting how tobacco companies have aimed to undermine 
the work of the WHO on tobacco control over the years and therewith aimed to capture the 
institution. The report claims that it does ‘not necessarily’ represent the WHO’s official policy and was 
written by experts in their personal capacity rather than as governmental representatives. And yet, 
for all these caveats, the message is clearly one of ‘naming and shaming’ the tobacco industry, in the 
hope (one may presume) that others may behave in more commendable ways: detailing and 
publishing behavior deemed undesirable may in itself be an exercise of authority.58   
 
b. Substantive Matters: Constitutional Techniques 
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The WHO has two standard-setting powers which immediately catch the eye. The first, which it has in 
common with many other international organizations, is the power to adopt multilateral conventions. 
The power rests with its plenary organ (the World Health Assembly), and entails a power to have such 
conventions concluded under its auspices. Thus far, it has been utilized only once, with the conclusion 
of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, and this, in turn, reportedly owed much to the 
ambition of the then Director-General, Gro Harlem Brundtland, to leave a tangible legacy.59  While 
sponsoring conventions provides the WHO with an undeniable stake in their contents, nonetheless 
these conventions formally depart only marginally from the classic model of treaty-making: they may 
be adopted by the Assembly by a two-thirds majority, but will enter into force only for those states 
that accept them in accordance with their constitutional processes.60 Hence, the organization 
functions mostly as a forum for diplomacy61, although it may also be involved in identifying the topic 
to be regulated, and identifying, formulating, developing and advocating specific approaches.62 The 
main difference with regular treaty-making outside the institutional context is that under Article 20 of 
the WHO Constitution, the member states are under an obligation to take action relative to the 
acceptance of WHO conventions within eighteen months, and are expected to provide reasons for 
their non-acceptance.63 Thus, there is an element of peer pressure built into the system, and in theory 
such peer pressure can be highly effective. In practice, this formalized peer pressure may prove too 
burdensome, and the same applies to the obligation to report annually on the progress made with 
respect to a number of different instruments under Article 62 of the WHO Constitution. Indeed, it has 
been suggested that the most important contribution by the WHO to the Tobacco Convention 
consisted of leadership and expertise, rather than substantive or even through peer pressure: ‘WHO 
neither drafted the Convention nor dictated its content. That was a matter for states to 
determine…’.64 
Being a Framework Convention, it has been supplemented by a first protocol, adopted in 2012 but, 
importantly, adopted not by the World Health Assembly but by the parties to the Framework 
Convention, meeting as Conference of the Parties. The protocol addresses illicit trade in tobacco 
products, and at the time of writing has 51 parties. The Framework Convention itself entered into 
force in 2005 and has attracted, to date, 181 parties. This suggests a secondary, radiating, normative 
effect: the parties to the Framework Convention, aided and perhaps partly steered by its Secretariat, 
can further expand the field of global health governance. This is not, technically, the WHO acting, as 
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legally the WHO qua organization and the Framework Convention qua organization are distinct; but 
overlap between the two is considerable, the Convention Secretariat is housed at WHO headquarters, 
and it would be difficult to imagine the two going in opposite directions. Indeed, the World Health 
Assembly has resolved to strengthen institutional connections – witness for instance Resolution 
A72/57.65 
As an academic matter it may be argued that since the Framework Convention is clearly a legally 
binding instrument, the category ‘epistemic authority’ does little work here – lawyers should take 
note at any rate. While such would be a fair comment, it would also be unduly limited, in that, again, 
its origins within the WHO matter. The WHO holds expertise on public health; it is the public health 
community signifying that tobacco control is worth striving for. Put differently, had the Framework 
Convention been adopted by the General Assembly of the UN, it would have resonated differently, 
precisely because the General Assembly cannot invoke (however implicitly) any specific expertise on 
the topic of tobacco control. In such a way, its origins within the WHO may help strengthen the 
‘compliance pull’66 of the Framework Convention. 
Second, under its Constitution (Article 21), the WHO has the power to adopt regulations concerning a 
number of issues: sanitary requirements, nomenclatures, standards for diagnostic procedures, 
standards relating to product safety, and regulations relating to advertising and labelling. This has 
been used sparingly: in 2005 the World Health Assembly adopted the most recent International 
Health Regulations, an instrument first adopted in 1951.67 These come into force for all members 
upon their adoption by the World Health Assembly (more precisely, upon a deadline communicated 
after adoption by the Director-General), but offer states the possibility to ‘opt out’: member states 
may reject the regulations or make reservations, under Article 22 of the WHO Constitution. The 
current International Health Regulations are in force since 2007, and binding for 196 states (the 194 
member states of the WHO plus two non-members, the Holy See and Liechtenstein). Already in 1948 
the first WHA adopted the so-called Nomenclature regulations, addressing the unification of 
statistical information regarding morbidity and mortality.68 
The more conventional way for international organizations to get their opinions across is by adopting 
recommendations, and the WHO is no exception: the plenary World Health Assembly can adopt 
recommendations which, as the label suggests, are not considered to give rise to binding obligations, 
within any matter within its competence. Perhaps the best-known of these is the 1981 International 
Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes69, whereas the Assembly in 2010 adopted the Global 
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Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel.70 Likewise, the Pandemic 
Influenza Preparedness Framework, detailed and ambitious and adopted in 2011, takes the form of a 
recommendation.71 
A much more often used instrument is the so-called ‘strategy’, although like the two Codes 
mentioned above, they share the legal basis of article 23 of the Constitution. Over the years, well over 
twenty of these have been adopted, dealing with drugs, or global immunization, or other general 
issues, or dealing with specific diseases, such as the strategy for malaria control or for the prevention 
and control of AIDS. These are adopted by the World Health Assembly and while technically not 
considered to be legally binding, their epistemic authority is considerable. 
In addition to the recommendations for which a legal basis can be found in the constitution, there is a 
seemingly far larger category of recommendations ‘developed by the Secretariat on the basis of a 
general grant of authority by a governing body’.72 These include such diverse topics as 
recommendations to the UN relating to psychotropic substances and drugs; a list of essential 
medicines; and a list of non-proprietary names aimed to prevent the active ingredients in medicines 
from being appropriated as trademarks – typically, these are based on professional expertise above 
all.73  
Under article 28 of the WHO Constitution, the Executive Board (the executive organ of the WHO) has 
the far-reaching power to take emergency actions. In particular, the Director-General may be 
authorized by the Executive Board to take emergency steps to combat epidemics, or to help organize 
health relief to victims, and urgent studies can be commissioned. The relevance of such a power is not 
to under-estimated: as one commentator notes, this is ‘the closest thing to the Security Council’s 
Chapter VII power in the WHO’s Constitution.’74 A notable example is its use by the Executive Board in 
2015 in response to the Ebola outbreak.  
 
c. Substantive Matters: Techniques not Envisaged in the Constitution 
 
The WHO utilizes a host of different techniques though which it exercises authority in one form or 
another. One example is that it publishes (and has done so since 1949) a Technical Reports series, 
containing largely the results of medical research. These are written by outside experts and expert 
groups, and typically contain recommendations directed to medical practitioners, medical scholars, 
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and politicians. The WHO here functions mostly as a platform for disseminating research results, but 
even so: the authority of the platform enhances the authority of the information thus conveyed.75  
More in the nature of governance by indicators is the annual (since 1995) World Health Report, 
focusing on a different issue each year and often dedicated to medical policy. The World Health 
Reports contain much statistical material and are happy to issue recommendation on how best to 
achieve the particular policy goals discussed. As Goldmann astutely observes though, there are less 
suitable for consistent governance. Precisely because they often target different issues, they are not 
well-equipped to show progress or regress over time – subsequent issues are difficult to compare.76  
It is worth mentioning that some have ascribed normative effect to surveys and comparisons. Even if 
these gave rise subsequently to action plans or other instruments, the surveys themselves may 
already manifest epistemic authority. Surveys on mental health, for instance, have generated detailed 
knowledge about national practices and general effects; even if strict comparisons would prove 
unsound, nonetheless patterns may emerge which can provide not only the basis for subsequent 
comparisons, but also entails suggestions as to what approaches might work and, not unimportant, 
allow the organization concerned to position itself as an authority, perhaps to the exclusion of other, 
competing authorities.77 
Immunization coverage indicators suggest, in a nutshell, how widespread immunization against 
particular diseases is in a particular state, and can be deeply interventionist. As Fisher sums up their 
importance: ‘They influence professional and public opinion towards promotion and expansion of 
routine immunization, guide allocation of resources and decisions of whether and where to introduce 
new vaccines, and shape broader health policies.’78 One remarkable effect is that these indicators 
have come to be used as proxies for how well a country is doing in terms of its health policies, and are 
used by international financial institutions as benchmarks to qualify for international financing.79 
Rather explicit exercises at influencing individual behavior are the travel warnings that may be issued 
by the WHO,80 even if their use seems mostly to have occurred during the SARS outbreak in the early 
2000s. If their legal character was unclear at first, it quickly became solidified, in all probability 
because governments and other actors need to know to what extent they must rely on, or can ignore, 
the travel warnings. For insurance purposes, e.g., the precise legal basis and effect of a travel warning 
may well prove important. 
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Above the International Health Regulations were mentioned, for all intents and purposes to be 
considered as legal instruments in that upon adoption they become binding on the entire WHO 
membership, save for those states that reject them. The International Health Regulations used to be 
supplemented by clarifications, i.e., authoritative interpretations of what the International Health 
Regulations entail and expect from the member states. These clarifications could emanate from 
bodies or individuals other than the WHA, but the practice has been discontinued: the 2005 IHR can 
give rise to the proclamation of emergencies and possibly recommendations by the Director-General, 
but that is not quite the same thing. Similar documents are the guidelines relating to the annexes of 
the International Health Regulations: the Guidelines for the Use of Annex 2, for instance, instruct 
states to report events to the WHO, in almost algorithm-like manner.81 
Those same Guidelines also produces scenarios, aimed at ‘stabilizing’ the law by giving people a sense 
of what is expected in certain specific circumstances. Interestingly, thee scenarios therewith function 
not unlike court decisions in common law systems: by sketching what is right and wrong in specific 
sets of factual circumstances, these scenarios suggest which behavior is palatable, and which is 
difficult to align with the overarching legal prescriptions.82 
A normative role of a different sort is played when the WHO interjects itself as an intermediary 
between various groupings of its member states. This plays out perhaps most typically in connection 
with the International Conference on the Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration 
of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH). This is a network of industry associations and drug 
regulators from the US, EU and Japan, geared towards harmonizing requirements of drug registration. 
The US, EU and Japan are all represented in the WHO, but form only a small fraction of its 
membership; indeed, it has been suggested that ICH was established precisely to avoid the WHO 
altogether.83 Setting strict standards in ICH means setting standards that are too high for many states 
in the global south and often, also, unjustified by technical concerns – in such cases the WHO may 
intervene, aiming to mediate between the two broad fractions of its membership, unlikely as this may 
be given that the general point of ICH is to circumvent the WHO.84 
But perhaps the most effective (if not perhaps the most cost-efficient) way of exercising epistemic 
authority is by training and related activities, and this the WHO does in abundance. Training can focus 
on what generally to do in case of emergencies, and it can focus on how to handle specific situations. 
It can take the form of classroom simulations, but can also take the form of relatively quick on-line 
courses (which may be quick in that they do not take much time to be completed). The website of the 
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WHO lists no less than 45 courses offering training in addressing specific diseases (the number is 
deceptive, in that some of these are offered in multiple languages).85 In addition, four general courses 
are offered in a variety of languages on what the WHO refers to as health security: two on the 
International Health Regulations, one on ship sanitation, and one on ‘events management’ at ports of 
entry.86  
The WHO website further reports that during the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak, more than 11000 
persons from over 160 countries participated in the on-line Occupational Health and Safety course or 
equivalent, while 5600 doctors, nurses and paramedical staff were trained in clinical management. 
Hundreds of thousands of volunteers were trained in social mobilization, and several hundreds of 
people received training in conducting safe and dignified burials of Ebola victims.87 This is one 
example of exercising epistemic authority: instructing thousands of people on how to act in a specific 
set of circumstances. Related techniques include the publication of handbooks, manuals and ‘best 
practices’ guides: these suggest there are particular, superior ways of doing things, and coming from 
the WHO, they are both imbued with epistemic authority and in a position to exercise it. Interestingly, 
these may also support and recommend other WHO practices. Thus, by way of random example, a 
document on ‘best practice for sharing influenza viruses and sequence data’, produced in 2007, 
recommends that states shall not obstruct the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network, and 
should support the earlier adopted Global Pandemic Influenza Action Plan to Increase vaccination 
Supply.88 This is justified by pointing out that studies indicate that the WHO is on top of things: 
activities of the Global Influenza Surveillance Network, coordinated by the WHO for more than half a 
century, demonstrate that the activities of countries under coordination of the WHO, form a reliable 
defense. Here then, epistemic authority is invoked by the WHO (the WHO knows best), and exercised 
by the WHO (do as the WHO suggests) on the basis of its expertise (the WHO knows best), in a single 
governance loop.89 
Whether all these emanations of epistemic authority have legal effects is, of course, in part a matter 
of definition. The strict positivist might say that not being given recognizably legal form, such 
instruments do not engender legal effects – and from her vantage point, the strict positivist would be 
right. And yet, it also seems the case that many of these examples of epistemic authority are intended 
to have some effects in the real world – are intended to make people change their behaviour, or at 
least behave in conformity with certain specific ways of doing things, and that may well be captured 
under the heading ‘legal effect’. The point is to suggest that much authority is being exercised in ways 
that defy or circumvent established legal categories, but are nonetheless legally cognizable, if not 
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involving typical concerns about enforcement and compliance, then at least in terms of proper 
exercises of authority, public power, and related topics. Put strongly, for present purposes my interest 
as a lawyer is not with whether a violation of a travel advice meets with some form of punishment, 
but rather with whether the travel recommendation is properly something for the WHO to 
promulgate. And in order even to begin asking that sort of question, it is necessary first to provide an 
overview of the work of the WHO. 
 
IV. Collaboration and Competition 
 
The WHO, it should be clear from the above, can exercise considerable epistemic authority, as can 
many other international organizations. What should already also be visible is that the WHO is not a 
closed universe, and does not operate in a closed universe. Not only has it spawned what has recently 
been referred to as ‘organization progeny’ in the form of the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control which generates its own normative authority, 90 but in addition the WHO cooperates with 
many partners, both governmental and non-governmental, and operates more broadly in the field of 
global governance, where it competes with other entities for the scarce resources of funding and 
legitimacy. 
The WHO has traditionally been one of the pioneers of partnerships, including public-private 
partnerships, playing a leading role perhaps only matched by the World Bank. The best-known of its 
partnerships goes back to the 1960s, when increased scientific knowledge about food safety 
suggested a need to inform the public at large about what would be safe to consume, and what could 
be risky. If left unregulated, it was easy to see that capitalism’s inherent race to the bottom would 
result in the use of cheap ingredients in food products without much regard for long-term health 
consequences. Hence, in the early 1960s the WHO and the FAO joined forces, and in 1963 the first 
meeting of the Codex Alimentarius Commission took place.91 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission is in part a risk assessment exercise, with expert committees 
assessing the risks of such things as food additives on a scientific basis. This then feeds into the more 
politicized process of standard-setting. It was clear from the outset that the food standards developed 
by the Codex Alimentarius Commission would formally not be legally binding: the food industries of 
the developed world have too much to lose by subjecting themselves to externally imposed 
standards. And yet, it was also clear from the outset that the standards would exercise great 
authority, for even accounting for the amount of politics and horse-trading that inevitably goes on in 
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the Commission92, its standards will offer a higher level of food safety than if no standards would be 
in place.  
The Codex received a further boost in 1995, with the entry into force of the treaty establishing the 
World Trade Organization. Two of its instruments, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, provide that states can invoke 
international standards such as Codex Alimentarius standards as reasons to ban the importation of 
food products not considered safe. This does not render them legally obligatory, but it does give them 
some legal force. Even so, the point to note is that while the legal force may add to the epistemic 
authority, that epistemic authority was already in place, and there would have been little reason to 
elevate the Codex standards in this way if the Commission did not exercise epistemic authority to 
begin with. 
In a variation on this theme, Alvarez and Kirgis have both noted that there is an interactive process 
ongoing between the WHO and the global drugs regime. The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs has 
the competence to add or delete substances to various lists that could be subject to control, but in 
doing so must rely on the assessment of the WHO as to whether the drug in question can produce 
dependence and can be abused. In other words, the assessment of the WHO possesses considerable 
probative value.93 
There are many other partnerships engaged in by the WHO, with the better known including the GAVI 
Alliance (GAVI stands for Global Alliance on Vaccines and Immunization; its official name now seems 
to be Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance94), the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Malaria and Tuberculosis (Global 
Fund), Unitaid (addressing pandemics) and UNAIDS (addressing HIV/AIDS). In three of these 
partnerships the partners include the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which potentially raises 
questions about private sector influence (no matter how benign and philanthropic – and there is little 
reason to query the Foundation’s intentions) on public sector action: the boundary between private 
and public, fluid to begin with, becomes rather porous this way, and this in turn may have 
repercussions for the sort of activities undertaken: activities for which little or no private funding can 
be found might not be undertaken.95 
There may be distributive effects as well - WHO actions can have serious effects on the private sector. 
A decision to declare a pandemic may benefit those pharmaceutical companies that have vaccines 
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ready to be marketed; their competitors may find that they are too late. Likewise, such decisions may 
come to influence patterns of trade and tourism, therewith inevitably having distributive effects, even 
if such distributive effects are fully unintentional. As a result, the WHO affects not just the health 
sector (in accordance with its mandate and in accordance with the functionalist theory underlying the 
law of international organizations), but also acts in fields such as trade and tourism. 
Its decisions (and its non-decisions) may also come to have security effects: a pandemic identified late 
in the day may lead to large numbers of displaced persons, which may come to be seen as security 
threat, all the more so if those displaced people turn out indeed to be carrying a nasty disease or 
virus. And conversely, the global security regime may interfere (or collaborate, if you will) with the 
global health regime, as when the UN Security Council in 2014 declared the outbreak of Ebola in 
Africa a ‘threat to international peace and security’.96 Likewise, the interface between the global 
health regime and the human rights regime has long been recognized,97 as well as the role of relevant 
epistemic communities in framing issues in particular manner.98 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
One does not have to be a card-carrying Foucauldian to realize that power and authority are not only 
matters of formal law-making competences, working their way from the top down through 
regularized legislative and diplomatic channels. It seems intuitively obvious that power and authority 
can be exercised in all sorts of manners, flowing through capillaries as much as through the regular 
channels, and potentially going in all possible directions – not merely top-down.99 The problem for 
international lawyers has not so much been to grasp this; at least since the late 1940s, with the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international lawyers have realized that law 
and authority can move along separate tracks.100 Instead, the problem has been – and still is – 
properly to address it, to develop a vocabulary and analytical apparatus to deal with it. 
Clearly, the regular international law framework, insisting as it does on treaties and custom and 
consent, is insufficient to capture the normative effects emanating from handbooks written by the 
WHO, or training provided by its officials. Equally clearly, calling these manifestations ‘soft law’ is 
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insufficient: putting a new label on an unknown substance does not by itself clarify the substance – it 
takes a working concept of soft law (going beyond claiming it is not hard law) for that description to 
do any work, and such a working concept is still sorely lacking. 
It has long been observed that governance is increasingly dropping is classical-modernist leanings, and 
moving towards network models, for better or worse.101 This article has aimed to demonstrate that in 
international organizations, and in particular the WHO, there is far more going on than meets the eye, 
in the hope that this will stimulate lawyers into thinking about the exercises of authority, epistemic 
and otherwise. The label ‘epistemic’ is perhaps not always necessary (although it may still be useful) 
when assessing and analyzing the traditional legal output of international organizations: the binding 
resolutions (such as those emanating from the UN Security Council), or the conventions adopted 
under their auspices. But the circumstance that authority can be based on elements other than formal 
law-making powers (elements such as knowledge, science, expertise) and can be exercised in ways 
other than through formally binding instruments (through guidelines, training, manuals), should not 
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